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This paper identifies factors that influence decisions about a country's financial safety net, using a
comprehensive dataset covering 180 countries during the 1960-2003 period. Our analysis focuses on
how private interest-group pressures, outside influences, and political-institutional factors affect deposit-insurance
adoption and design. Controlling for macroeconomic shocks, quality of bank regulations, and institutional
development, we find that both private and public interests, as well as outside influences to emulate
developed-country regulatory schemes, can explain the timing of adoption decisions and the rigor
of loss-control arrangements. Controlling for other factors, political systems that facilitate intersectoral
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Introduction 
This paper portrays government decisions about the design of a country’s financial safety net as 
an exercise in incomplete social contracting.  The contract authorizes failed financial institutions 
and their customers to transfer some of their losses to taxpayers in other sectors of the economy. 
Social contracting is a political bargaining process in which different sectors attempt to extract 
net value from government services. Although financial stability is a nonexclusive good, its 
benefits need not be enjoyed equally by every sector. Successful contracting requires that the 
terms appear mutually beneficial. Especially because the rights and duties generated in safety net 
contracting are incomplete, sectoral concerns and contract terms may be expected to vary greatly 
across countries.  This paper tests and confirms the hypothesis that across countries salient 
differences in safety net design can be explained to an important degree by differences in 
economic and political circumstances. 
Our analysis seeks particularly to determine what factors influence two issues in safety 
net design: (1) a country’s decision on whether or not to adopt a system of explicit deposit 
insurance; and (2) for countries that adopt explicit deposit insurance, the type of design features 
imbedded in their deposit insurance system. We focus on the extent of deposit insurance 
coverage, but also include other design features that could control the banking sector’s ability to 
extract net rents from other sectors. We investigate these issues using a newly collected dataset 
on deposit insurance schemes and selected design features for a large sample of countries. 
  Cross-country differences in political arrangements are bound to affect both kinds of 
decisions.  The presence of an explicit deposit insurance system and how it is designed affects 
many constituencies, especially banks, depositors, creditors, specialized bureaucracies, and 
taxpayers. Because individual constituencies have conflicting interests, the political process 
governing adoption and design decisions can be complex.     
  3 
 
Economists presume that political dealmaking serves both public and private interests.  
Public-interest rationales for deposit insurance focus on protecting small, uninformed depositors 
and assuring the stability of the banking system (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  Private-interest 
rationales portray regulatory decisions as the outcome of interest-group competition, in which 
well-organized or powerful groups compete with voters to pressure public-spirited, but 
opportunistic politicians and regulators for regulatory interventions that enable sponsoring 
groups to capture rents from other sectors (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983).  
Deposit insurance subsidizes banks that are prepared to exploit weaknesses in 
supervisory risk control to extract value from taxpayers and safer banks. Safety-net subsidies 
may be defined as implicit risk capital that the government administers in helping to recapitalize 
banks when they become deeply insolvent. It is natural to hypothesize that differences in the 
distribution of political clout would influence safety net design. Financial institutions regularly 
lobby for “reforms” that promise to increase their franchise value (Kroszner and Stratmann, 
1998). The more a country’s political system allows sectors to share power, the better narrow 
private interests can make their concerns felt. 
  An extensive literature analyzes the public and private benefits and costs of explicit 
deposit insurance and explores theoretically the challenges of designing an optimal deposit 
insurance system.
1  Our paper is part of an emerging, complementary body of empirical research. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) show that 
deposit insurance design features affect banking system fragility and market discipline. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002), Laeven (2002), and Hovakimian, Kane and Laeven (2003) 
show that weak institutional environments undermine deposit insurance design. 
                                                           
1 See for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Ronn and Verma (1986), Pennacchi (1987), Chari and Jagannathan 
(1988), Cooperstein et al. (1995), Kane (1995), Wheelock and Wilson (1995), Calomiris (1996), Bhattacharya et al. 
(1998), and Allen and Gale (1998), and Pennacchi (2006). 
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Studies of how political factors affect deposit insurance reform focus predominantly on 
the United States. Calomiris and White (1994) argue that federal deposit insurance benefited 
predominantly small and poorly diversified unit banks and that, had not the Great Depression 
reduced confidence in the banking system as a whole, their pleas for federal insurance could not 
have overcome the opposition of politically stronger large banks.  Kane and Wilson (1998) show 
that, in the face of the Great Depression, large banks’ wish list changed and that large banks’ 
share prices benefited greatly from introducing deposit insurance precisely because depositors 
had lost confidence in banks of all sizes. Kroszner (1998) argues that deposit insurance is 
favored by riskier banks, because they can extract a net subsidy at the expense of safer banks in 
the presence of an insufficiently risk-sensitive premium structure. He shows that lobbying by 
small, risky banks in U.S. has historically accorded with the private interests of this sector. 
Similarly, Economides, Hubbard, and Palia (1996) argue that in the U.S. deposit insurance was 
instituted for the benefit of the small, unit banks.  
Kroszner and Strahan (2001) study whether interest-group pressures can explain voting 
outcomes in the U.S. House of Representatives on the Wylie Amendment on limiting deposit 
insurance to a single account per bank. They find that limits to deposit insurance were opposed 
by representatives from states where small banks had a large share of the market and by states 
with a large proportion of elderly people. The amendment was favored by representatives of 
states where banks could sell insurance products and where the insurance industry was relatively 
large. 
Our paper is most closely related to Laeven’s (2004) investigation of how political 
arrangements affect coverage levels across countries.  Our more comprehensive dataset lets us 
model simultaneously decisions about adoption and numerous aspects of system design.     
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It is important to investigate how different country characteristics, including differences 
in political systems, affect political support for deposit insurance. Laeven (2004) is able to study 
only one element of deposit insurance design in a cross-country context (deposit insurance 
coverage) and uses single-equation methods to explain this variable in only one date (the year 
2000). Using a two-equation framework that controls for how country characteristics influence 
the logically prior decision to adopt deposit insurance, we are able to study how the evolution of 
characteristics over time affects the adoption of a series of loss-control features. Like Laeven, we 
find that deposit insurance coverage is higher in countries where poorly capitalized banks 
dominate the market, but we are able to show that risky banks lobby against efforts to control 
risk-shifting in other ways as well. 
Our paper offers two advances. First, we create a new dataset of deposit insurance design 
features that (unlike previous studies) covers all countries that offer explicit deposit insurance 
and tracks changes in design features across time in every country. Second, we use this 
comprehensive database to generate cross-country evidence on the determinants of the adoption 
and design of deposit insurance systems. 
  We use discrete choice and proportional hazard models to analyze the adoption of deposit 
insurance.
2 To study deposit insurance design, we use two-stage selection models that account 
for selection bias by including countries that lack explicit deposit insurance. 
  We find that external pressures and internal politics play significant roles in adoption and 
design decisions. Other things equal, the more contestable a country’s political system, the more 
likely it is both to adopt explicit deposit insurance and to adopt inadequate risk controls. We 
                                                           
2 Similar models have previously been used by Kroszner and Strahan (1999) to analyze the timing of the elimination 
of bank branching restrictions in U.S. states, by Pagano, Penetta and Zingales (1998) to explain the decision of 
companies to go public, and by Shumway (2001) to explain corporate bankruptcies.    
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confirm that private interests, particularly the relative importance of risky banks in the country, 
exercise an important but not exclusive influence on adoption and design decisions. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes some recent trends in 
deposit insurance adoption and design. Section 3 introduces testable hypotheses about the nature 
of interest-group bargaining, defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis, describes 
the sources used to construct these variables, and presents summary statistics for all included 
variables. Section 4 specifies and estimates statistical models of the adoption decision. Section 5 
explains how selection models can be used to explain deposit insurance design and offers 
empirical estimates of two-stage models of adoption and design. Section 6 underscores our 
principal findings. 
 
2. Adoption and Design Features of Deposit Insurance  
The first national system of deposit insurance was introduced in 1934 in the United States. Since 
then, many countries have followed suit. Figure 1 displays all countries with explicit deposit 
insurance schemes as of year-end 2003. The 1990s saw a particularly rapid spread of explicit 
deposit insurance. In 1995, only 49 countries offered explicit deposit insurance, but by 2003 this 
number had surged to 87 countries, an increase of almost 80 percent. Although much of this 
recent surge can be attributed to transition countries of Eastern Europe, recent adopters can be 
found on every continent. 
  Besides adoption dates, we compile information about specific design features of the 
particular scheme that each adopting country installs. Since deposit insurance reduces depositor 
incentives to monitor banks and increases stockholder incentives to increase bank risk taking, 
deposit insurance design should seek to counterbalance these adverse incentives (Kane, 1995; 
Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor, 1998).     
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Depositor and other private discipline are improved by: (i) limiting coverage, (ii) 
excluding particular types of deposits (such as foreign-currency or interbank deposits) from the 
system, (iii) introducing coinsurance of depositors, and (iv) setting coverage limits per depositor 
rather than per account, so that depositors cannot simply increase coverage by spreading deposit 
balances across multiple accounts. Stockholder discipline can be improved by introducing risk-
sensitive premia, so that banks that take more risk are “penalized” by higher premiums.
3  
Regulatory discipline is also key to a well-functioning deposit insurance regime. 
Regulatory discipline can be improved by private-sector involvement in the management of the 
deposit insurance system, because private parties are generally considered to be better at 
monitoring banks and banks (in particular) are apt to solicit better information with which to 
monitor one another than government officials can. It also matters whether membership in a 
country’s scheme is compulsory or voluntary. Compulsory membership reduces adverse 
selection among banks and forces strong banks to lobby for effective risk-shifting control. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) confirm that systems with compulsory membership 
outperform voluntary schemes.  
Our analysis focuses not only on decisions about individual design features, but looks 
also at how features interact in indices of overall risk control described in section 4. 
 
3. Hypotheses and Definitions 
Our goal is to assess the relative importance of public interests, private interests, external 
pressures, and internal institutional and political environments in influencing a country’s 
                                                           
3 The risk-controlling potential of ex ante deposit insurance premiums may be limited. Chan, Greenbaum , and 
Thakor (1992) argue that it is difficult to introduce risk-based deposit insurance premiums because this would 
require perfect information on banks behavior. With imperfect information, actuarially fair premiums may not be 
feasible and may generate additional risk shifting. Pennacchi (2006) shows that even actuarially fair insurance 
premiums would not eliminate incentives for banks to take excessive risks.    
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decision to adopt deposit insurance and follow-on decisions it makes about safety-net design, 
specifically about the extent of deposit insurance coverage and other risk-shifting controls.  
We pattern our tests as closely as possible on models others have used to explain 
adoption and coverage decisions (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Laeven, 2004). However, 
differences in data availability across countries obviously constrain the span of variables we can 
include. Public and private benefits cannot always be separated and many variables can only be 
observed for a few points in time. To include time-invariant country-level variables in the 
analysis, we experiment with country fixed effects. 
Sections 3a and 3b develop testable hypotheses about the roles of public interests, private 
interests, and internal and external political and institutional forces. These sections also explain 




Social costs of deposit insurance are apt to grow with the size and riskiness of the protected 
sector. Social costs arise from deadweight costs of intervention, from the displacement of market 
discipline, and from moral hazard effects on insured banks. Small and undercapitalized banks 
have traditionally been cast as supporters of deposit insurance (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; 
Laeven, 2004).
4 
5 These banks’ private interests are best served when deposit insurance is 
adopted earlier and entails fewer risk-shifting controls. This leads us to investigate whether it 
makes a differences if the market share of small (or undercapitalized) banks is large relative to 
                                                           
4 Keeley (1990) shows that banks will risk bankruptcy only if the option value of deposit insurance exceeds the 
franchise value of continuing to operate the bank. Given that small and undercapitalized banks tend to have lower 
franchise values, it is expected that they benefit to a greater extent from explicit deposit insurance than large and 
well-capitalized banks.    
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that of large (or well-capitalized) banks. Where small or undercapitalized banks are relatively 
important, public interests would be best served if deposit insurance were adopted late and were 
to incorporate rigorous risk-shifting control.  
Banks relative to other providers of financial services 
A number of countries permit banks to sell insurance products. In such countries, one would 
expect insurance firms to oppose the adoption of deposit insurance for fear that government 
backing would make it easier for banks to take business away from them. Where banks can 
underwrite insurance products and the insurance industry is important relative to the banking 
industry, insurers’ might be able to both delay deposit insurance adoption and to impose more-
rigorous risk-shifting controls. On the other hand, the public interest would favor adoption if 
deposit insurance makes it easier for banks to exploit economies of scope. In this case, efficiency 
gains would rise with the size of bank insurance offerings and the public interest would call for 
early adoption in countries where banks already sell insurance and the insurance sector is large.  
Demographics 
As a block, elderly people generally have more financial assets than younger people and often 
employ bank deposits as their main savings vehicle. This would dispose them to favor deposit 
insurance. Their private interests would seem to be better served when deposit insurance is 
adopted earlier. However, rigorous risk-shifting control also seems more likely to emerge in 
countries with a relatively large share of elderly people. To the extent that elderly people are less 
sophisticated and exert less depositor discipline on banks, the public interest would call for early 
adoption and rigorous risk control. 
External political pressure and financial crises 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 On the other hand, Kane and Wilson (1998) find evidence that large banks benefited most from the introduction of 
deposit insurance in the United States. If this were true in other countries as well, then large-bank interests might 
dominate adoption and decision decisions.    
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Outside pressure may be generated in several ways. We hypothesize that, when deciding whether 
to adopt deposit insurance, policymakers are influenced by choices made by policymakers in 
other countries. As explicit deposit insurance becomes widespread, it becomes a hallmark of 
regulatory best practice, and countries become more prone to adopt it (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002). 
  In some countries, the restraining influence of internal economic and political 
determinants may have been overcome by domestic and foreign pressure to emulate safety-net 
arrangements in other countries, without adequately tailoring the design features to differences in 
public and private contracting environments.  To test this hypothesis, we estimate models of 
deposit insurance adoption and design that include proxies for outside pressure. 
Outside pressure may come directly from supranational agencies. Starting in the 1990s, 
IMF crisis-management advice recommended adopting explicit deposit insurance as a way either 
of containing crises or of formally winding down crisis-generated blanket guarantees (Folkerts-
Landau and Lindgren, 1998; Garcia, 1999).  The World Bank and European Union (EU) have 
endorsed explicit deposit insurance as well.  
External political pressure is particularly effective during times of financial crises. The 
adoption of deposit insurance is more likely during banking crises because one of the public 
rationales for deposit insurance is to prevent bank runs and ensure financial stability (Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983). This leads us to investigate whether and how the occurrence of a financial 
crisis might affect the timing and character of deposit insurance decisions. 
Political and legal institutions 
In addition to identifiable private and public interests, specific political, legal, and economic 
factors are likely to affect the timing and character of deposit insurance decisions. Demirgüç-   
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Kunt and Kane (2002) argue that countries have different contracting environments, and that 
these differences must be taken into account when designing a country’s financial safety net. 
  To separate economic from political and legal influences, all regression experiments 
control for the level of economic development. We also control for differences in political 
environments. In political systems that are more democratic, the voices of minority interest 
groups can express themselves more forcefully. Presumably, forces that lobby for deposit 
insurance can be more effective in democracies (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999). We test the 
hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, deposit insurance is adopted earlier and with fewer risk-shifting 
controls in more-democratic countries. 
Because moral hazard is exacerbated in countries with poor legal institutions (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Kane, 2002), the quality and enforcement of applicable laws may affect the adoption 
and design of deposit insurance. In countries where the quality of legal institutions is poor, the 
potential for corruption and abuse is higher. This is apt to generate opportunities for risk-shifting 
by insured banks. In countries with poor legal institutions, the public interest would be better 
served if deposit insurance were adopted later and imposed stronger risk-shifting controls. 
Bank regulation and supervision 
Increases in the rigor of bank regulation and supervision are apt to reduce the budgetary cost of 
providing deposit insurance. The pre-existence of expense-saving forms of regulatory discipline 
is likely to encourage the decision to install an explicit deposit insurance scheme. At the same 
time, the rigor of bank regulation is probably controlled by the very same political and economic 
factors that affect deposit insurance adoption and design (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2006). To 
investigate this issue, we examine the influence exerted by four aspects of bank regulation and 
supervision: stringency of capital regulations, restrictions on the activities banks can engage in 
(including securities underwriting, insurance, and real estate), entry restrictions, and official    
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supervisory power (including whether the supervisory framework supports prompt corrective 
action). 
Macroeconomic environment 
Finally, we introduce variables that capture macroeconomic developments that may affect the 
quality of bank assets, particularly the rate of growth of real GDP and the rate of inflation. These 
variables were used previously by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) to explain the 
incidence of banking crises. Our regression experiments introduce the size of a country’s fiscal 
deficit as well. High inflation often results from budget deficits that a government finances 
predominantly through money creation. Assuming taxpayers resist deficit expansion, a 
government may decide against introducing explicit deposit insurance when the contingent 
liabilities it creates for the government could not be tax-financed.  
 
3.b Data Sources and Definitions of Included Variables 
Our dataset is unique in covering design features for all countries that had adopted explicit 
deposit insurance through yearend 2003. The data were collected both from official country 
sources and supplemented by information fromWorld Bank country specialists. We also 
contacted deposit insurance agencies to extend data availability where necessary. Appendix 2 
details the sources of the data we employ. 
Our work expands an earlier Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci (2001) database in two ways. 
First, we update the endpoint to 2003 to incorporate data on recent adopters. Second, we create a 
time series of individual-country design features. Whereas the 2001 database provided data on 
coverage only for the year 2000, we track coverage levels for every year in which an explicit    
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deposit insurance scheme existed.
6 The complete database covers 181 countries. Of these 
countries, 87 (or 48%) have explicit deposit insurance (as of end-2003). This includes countries 
with blanket guarantees. Interestingly, although deposit insurance schemes can be found in all 
parts of the world, we find that explicit deposit insurance schemes are observed more frequently 
in developed countries than in developing countries
7.  
For all countries with explicit deposit insurance, we compile time-series information on 
eight design features: (i) the coverage ratio (Coverage ratio), which we define as the ratio of the 
coverage limit on insured deposits to per capita GDP; (ii) whether or not foreign currency 
deposits are covered (Foreign currency deposits); (iii) whether or not interbank deposits are 
covered (Interbank deposits); (iv) whether or not there is coinsurance (Coinsurance); (v) whether 
coverage applies per account or per depositor (Payment); (vi) whether premiums are flat or risk-
adjusted (Premiums); (vii) whether or not the administration of the scheme is exclusively 
publicly managed (i.e., without participation from the private sector) (Administration); and (viii) 
whether or not membership is voluntary (Membership). We calibrate each indicator variable so 
that a higher score denotes an increased potential for risk-shifting. We also aggregate these 
individual features to form indices of the overall rigor of risk-shifting control.  
We first investigate the determinants each index component separately. “Moral hazard 
indices” (Moral hazard) combine the eight individual features in different ways. The pre-
eminent index is the first principal component of the variance-covariance matrix of the eight 
features. As robustness tests, we also experiment with alternative moral hazard indexes that 
either include additional principal components or straightforwardly average the values of 
                                                           
6 For example, coverage levels in the United States have increased five times: from US$ 5,000 at adoption in 1934, 
to US$ 10,000 in 1950, to US$ 15,000 in 1966, to US$ 20,000 in 1969, to $40,000 in 1974, and finally to US$ 
100,000 since 1980. 
7 Using the World bank definition of a high-income and low-income country, we find that 78% of high-income 
countries, but only 16% of low-income countries offer explicit deposit insurance by year-end 2003.    
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individual indicators. Table 1 lists adopting countries, the year explicit deposit insurance was 
introduced, and the design features we investigate. 
We also collect data on the political and economic variables needed to test the hypotheses 
mentioned earlier. For all variables, time-series data cover the period 1960-2002, unless 
otherwise noted.  
We proxy the political clout of small banks by Small Banks, the fraction of banking assets 
in small banks in the country. A bank is considered small if its total assets are below 1 billion 
U.S. dollars. To proxy the clout of undercapitalized banks, we use Undercapitalized Banks, the 
fraction of  a country’s banking assets in banks showing a below-median capital to asset ratio. 
Data on bank size and capital come from Bankscope, a database containing financial data on 
international banks. Both categorizations are based on 1995-99 averages. 
To express the clout of the insurance sector, we use Insurance penetration. This variable 
expresses gross insurance premiums underwritten as a share of GDP. This information is 
collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Because data on insurance 
penetration starts in 1987, we use the mean value for 1987-2002. 
  To represent the clout exercised by elderly people, we use Pop65, which is the share of 
the population age 65 and over. These data also come from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database. 
  To proxy outside pressure, we experiment with several variables. Contagion is the 
fraction of countries in the sample that has adopted explicit deposit insurance at each point in 
time. This variable proxies the extent to which deposit insurance is believed to be a universal 
best practice. As more and more countries adopt deposit insurance, this nonlinear trend variable 
increases in value. IMF Pressure is a zero-one indicator whose value is one from 1999 on. In 
1999, the IMF published a best-practice paper on deposit insurance and its design, which    
  15 
 
recommended explicit deposit insurance for developing countries. The World Bank also 
recommended explicit deposit insurance for specific developing countries during the sample 
period. World Bank Loan is an indicator variable that has the value one for countries starting in 
the year the World Bank began an adjustment lending program that entailed installation of 
explicit deposit insurance. Data on World Bank lending programs that support deposit insurance 
come from World Bank (2004). The EU Directive on Deposit Insurance (which came into force 
in 1994) also encouraged deposit-insurance adoption, particularly for the EU accession countries. 
The 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004 had no choice but to adopt the minimum coverage 
set forth by the Directive. Prior to accession, these countries all established an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme. To capture this influence, we construct a variable, EU candidacy, that for EU 
candidate countries only, takes a value of one from 1994 on. 
To represent banking crises, we construct a binary variable, Crisis, whose value is one in 
years that a given country is experiencing a systemic banking crisis, and is zero otherwise. Data 
on the timing of banking crises come from Caprio et al. (2005). A banking crisis is defined as a 
situation in which significant segments of the banking sector become insolvent or illiquid, and 
cannot operate without special assistance from monetary or supervisory authorities.  
To characterize the political environment of a country, we focus on Polity score, an index 
that ranges from –10 to 10. Negative scores are assigned to countries that are autocracies and 
positive values to democracies. As a robustness check, we experiment with three other proxies. 
Democracy is a variable that ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores assigned to countries that 
are more democratic. Executive constraints is an index that measures the extent to which a 
country’s institutions constrain the decision-making powers of the country’s chief executive in 
ways that create other “accountability groups.”  This index ranges from 1 to 7.  Higher values 
indicate stronger restrictions on executive authority. Finally, political competition ranges from 1    
  16 
 
to 10, with higher scores representing increased political competition. This index tracks the 
extent to which non-elites access institutional structures for political expression. These data 
come from the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University 
of Maryland. Regression experiments presume that minority interest groups exercise more 
influence in political systems that are democratic, that place constraints on the executive power, 
and that are politically competitive. 
To capture the contracting environment of the country and the development of economic 
institutions more generally, we use the we use GDP per capita, and indices for Bureaucracy and 
Law and Order. Bureaucracy ranges from 0 to 4, increasing with strength and quality of the 
bureaucracy. Law and Order expresses the quality of country’s legal system and rule of law. It 
ranges from 0 to 6, where high scores indicate a high level of law and order. Because data on the 
quality of bureaucracy and law and order do not start until1984, we average data for these two 
variables over 1984-2002. 
  We represent differences in the macroeconomic environment by the following variables: 
GDP growth, Inflation, and Fiscal deficit.  Movement in these variables captures the size of 
internal and external macroeconomic shocks a country experiences. GDP growth is the growth 
rate in real GDP. Inflation is defined as the annual rate of inflation. Fiscal surplus is the ratio of 
fiscal surplus to GDP, where negative values denote fiscal deficits and positive values denote 
fiscal surpluses. These data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database. Because data on fiscal deficits are sparse (in particular, data are lacking for the last 
years in our sample period for many countries), our fiscal-deficit variable averages data over 
whatever sample is available. 
To measure the quality of bank regulation, we use four different variables. These 
variables are taken from the Barth et al. (2006) database and refer to data for the year 2003. In all    
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cases, higher scores denote greater restrictiveness. Capital regulatory index measures the 
stringency of capital regulations in the banking system. The index ranges from 0 to 7. Activity 
restrictions measures the degree to which banks can engage in securities underwriting, insurance, 
and real estate. The index ranges from 3 to 12. Entry restrictions captures regulatory 
requirements to set up a bank. The index ranges from 0 to 8. Official supervisory power is an 
index of the power supervisors have to discipline banks. The index ranges from 0 to 14. Barth et 
al. (2006) provides details on the construction of each variable. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in our study. The unit of 
observation is a country-year. For each variable, detailed definitions and sources are provided in 
Appendix 1. The first part of Table 2 lists a series of endogenous design features.  The mean 
value of the deposit insurance indicator variable, Deposit insurance, states the proportion of 
country-years in which the countries in our sample included explicit deposit guarantees in their 
safety net. This turns out to be only 17 percent, since many countries adopted deposit insurance 
relatively recently. The mean value of indicator variables for specific design characteristics tells 
us what proportion of explicit deposit insurance schemes incorporates each particular 
characteristic. Design variables are coded so that higher values indicate an increased exposure to 
risk-shifting, meaning that moral hazard is less rigorously controlled by that particular design 
feature. 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of deposit insurance variables and country 
characteristics across the years and countries for which data are available for both halves of each 
pair of variables.  The presence of explicit deposit insurance is positively associated with 
economic development (as measured by GDP per capita), external pressure indicators, crisis 
experience, and constraints on executive authority.  For countries with explicit insurance, we find 
that coverage levels and exposures to moral hazard are higher when per capita GDP and    
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constraints on executive authority are low, and during periods of increased external pressure.  
Coverage levels prove higher in countries where government ownership of banks is more 
extensive. Because we expect that the same variables would influence adoption and design, 
design decisions must be modeled simultaneously with adoption. To avoid selection bias, 
regressions seeking to explain design decisions are estimated simultaneously with a selection 
model of the adoption decision. 
 
4. Statistical Models of the Adoption Decision 
Using a hazard model, we first estimate how the political and economic variables we consider 
influence the timing of deposit insurance adoption. To explore the robustness of the inferences 
we make, we experiment with alternative models, including Probit models with time-fixed 
effects. 
A. Hazard Model of the Adoption Decision 
  A powerful way to analyze adoption timing is to estimate a hazard model. The hazard 
rate λ(t) estimates the probability that a country adopts deposit insurance in year t, given that it 
had not yet done so when the year began (Kiefer, 1988). Hazard models surmount the missing-
data problem created by right-censored data. Adoption dates for countries that had not yet 
adopted deposit insurance by 2003 are estimated by a synthetic adoption date extrapolated from 
the transitions observed for countries that did adopt during the sample period.  
  We experiment with two widely used models of the hazard rate. The first is the Cox 
proportional hazards model, which expresses the hazard rate as: 
    λ
i(t) = λ(t) exp (β'xi),                 (1) 
where x is any specified vector of potential explanatory variables.  The second is the Weibull 
model, which specifies that λ(t) in (1) evolves as:    
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    λ(t) = λαt
α-1.                 ( 2 )  
The evolutionary parameter α determines whether the hazard rate is increasing (α > 1), 
decreasing (α < 1), or constant (α = 1) over time. We report robust standard errors following Lin 
and Wei (1989). 
We designate the Weibull model as our preferred specification because it allows us to 
estimate the evolutionary parameter α. High and significant values of α denote positive duration 
dependence and can be interpreted as evidence of external influence or emulation. When 
employing duration-model techniques, our dataset reduces to a cross section of durations. The 
Weibull model lets us compare alternative specifications (focusing specifically on the values of 
α) to investigate the presence of external influence rather than either estimating a time trend or 
including Contagion as an explanatory variable. 
Assuming the availability of data for our explanatory variables, our sample period 
consists of the period 1960-2002. We exclude countries that adopted deposit insurance before 
1960 (i.e., the United States) from our analysis. Our initial sample consists of 180 countries, of 
which 86 adopted deposit insurance during the period 1960-2002. 
Figure 1 presents the Kaplan-Meier nonparametric estimate of the hazard function over 
time. The figure shows that the hazard function is relatively flat in the early years and then grows 
steeper in the later years. The particularly large increase observed in the hazard function during 
the 1990s coincides with the period that the IMF and the WB began to urge deposit insurance 
adoption. EU pressure towards EU accession countries probably also helped to increase the 
hazard function in the second part of the 1990s. During the period covered by the EU Directive 
on Deposit Insurance, 1994-2003, 42 countries introduced deposit insurance systems. Fourteen 
of these (i.e., one-third) are EU accession countries. 
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B. Regression Experiments Employing Weibull Hazard Models of the Adoption Decision 
Table 5 presents regression results for the Weibull hazard model. We first present regressions 
that exclude the bank regulatory variables, the institutional variables, and the insurance-
penetration variable because information on these variables is missing for many countries. We 
designate the main specification as regression (1). It uses Polity scores to proxy differences in 
political environments. Regressions (2) to (4) consider Democracy, Executive Constraints, and 
Political Competition as alternative proxies. Regression (5) adds the insurance-penetration 
variable and bank regulatory variables. Regression (6) introduces proxies for the quality of the 
bureaucracy and the law-and-order tradition in the country. Regressions (7) to (10) include the 
external-influence indicators WB Loan and EU Candidacy, experimenting with alternative 
proxies for political institutions.
8 Because explanatory variables enter exponentially, the 
coefficients reported in Table 5 are the logarithms of the underlying relative hazard coefficients.  
The relative hazard coefficients can be calculated as the antilog of the reported coefficients.  The 
exponent of each coefficient estimate shows the proportional increase in the hazard rate that 
occurs when the focal explanatory variable increases by one unit. 
We find that our proxy for the clout of small banks delays the introduction of deposit 
insurance. This result runs counter to the narrow private-interest view that presumes that small 
banks are invariably riskier than large ones and would lobby strongly for the adoption of deposit 
insurance. On the other hand, the result parallels the evidence presented by Kane and Wilson 
(1998) who show that large banks benefited most from the introduction of deposit insurance in 
the United States. The result is also consistent with public-interest theories that predict that 
deposit insurance should be adopted later in countries where small, risky banks are relatively 
important.    
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We also find that deposit insurance is adopted earlier in countries where undercapitalized 
banks have substantial clout. This is consistent with these banks’ private interests (and with the 
findings of Laeven, 2004). 
Both banking-structure effects are economically important. For example, regression (1) 
indicates that a one-standard deviation (22.5%) increase in Undercapitalized Banks  would 
increase the hazard rate for adopting deposit insurance by exp(0.013*22.5) = 1.34 points (or an 
increase of about 34 percent). This implies that countries with higher levels of Undercapitalized 
Banks are more likely to adopt sooner. 
Banking crises also raise the probability of early adoption. This is consistent with the 
notion that external political pressure to adopt deposit insurance may be particularly effective 
during financial crises, when the public rationales for deposit insurance spelled out by Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) -- i.e., to prevent bank runs and re-establish financial stability-- gain ground. 
We do not find that the share of elderly people significantly influences the probability of 
early adoption. While regression experiments usually generate a positive coefficient for Pop65 
(consistent with the private interests of the elderly), the effect never becomes statistically 
significant. 
Differences in the political environment of sample countries appear highly relevant. No 
matter how we proxy the quality of democratic institutions in the country, we find that increases 
in the political contestability of government control significantly raise the probability of early 
adoption. For example, in regression (1) the coefficient on Polity suggests that a one-standard 
deviation (7.6) increase in Polity would increase the hazard rate for adopting deposit insurance 
by exp(0.058*7.6) = 1.55 points (or an increase of about 55 percent). This result accords with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 We do not include the IMF and Contagion variables because these variables do not display cross-country variation 
and would therefore drop out of a Cox proportional hazards model.    
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Kroszner and Strahan (1999) who hold that the political lobby for deposit insurance is more 
effective in democracies where minority interest groups are more likely to be heard. 
Differences in macroeconomic environment of the country do not seem to matter much, 
although we find some weak evidence that countries are more likely to adopt deposit insurance 
when they run a fiscal surplus. This finding supports the view that in countries with persistent 
fiscal deficits governments may be unable or unwilling to introduce schemes that create 
contingent liabilities for the government. 
The bank regulatory and supervisory framework also does not appear to be an important 
factor in the adoption decision, although when we seek to control for bank regulatory and 
supervisory differences, our tests become less powerful. The usable sample shrinks to 1808 
observations for 72 countries. We find weak evidence that deposit insurance is introduced earlier 
in countries that allow banks to engage in a variety of activities, including securities, insurance, 
and real estate business. This finding challenges private-interest explanations that predict that 
adoption would be delayed in countries where banks can engage in nonbanking activities, such 
as the sale of insurance products. However, the result is consistent with the public-interest 
theories that predict that adoption should occur earlier in jurisdictions where banks offer 
insurance.  
Efforts to control for the quality of the bureaucracy and the law-and-order tradition serve 
mainly as robustness checks. Proxies for the quality of legal institutions do not add to the 
explanatory power of the model. They leave our main results unaltered and even increase the 
importance of the Polity variable, although the significance of the increase is undermined by the 
reduction in sample size. 
Finally, regressions (7) to (10) confirm the commonsense expectation that external 
pressure from the EU encouraged earlier adoption of deposit insurance by EU accession    
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countries. On the other hand, World Bank endorsement does not seem to have wielded a 
significant influence. 
  We also obtain a positive and significant estimate for the evolutionary parameter α . This 
tells us that the hazard function for adopting deposit insurance increases during our sample 
period 1960 – 2002.  To show how quickly, we compare the hazard rates for the years 1980 and 
2000.  Focusing on the estimate of α in regression (1), we find that for a typical country: 
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This tells us that such a country is more than 2 times more likely to adopt deposit insurance in 
2000 than in 1980.  This nonlinear trend approximates the emulation effect that we go on to 
estimate directly using the Contagion variable in Probit specifications.
9 That significant positive 
values are found for α in all Weibull specifications supports our contention that external 
influence is important. The likelihood of adoption at time t, conditional upon nonadoption prior 
to time t, increases over time.   
 
C. Robustness Experiments Employing Cox and Probit Models of the Adoption Decision 
Table 6 shows that results are similar if we use the Cox model rather than the Weibull model of 
the hazard rate. Because the Cox model excludes time variation in the hazard rate, it is 
impossible to include Contagion and IMF external pressure as potential determinants. In this 
model too [regressions (1) and (2)], deposit insurance is adopted earlier in countries that show a 
greater clout for large banks, that show greater clout for undercapitalized banks, that undergo 
financial crises, that are more democratic, and that are (former) EU accession countries. 
As a further robustness check, we also estimate Probit models of the decision. The 
endogenous variable has the value one in years when the country has explicit deposit insurance,    
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but is zero otherwise. We allow for correlation among errors for each country by estimating 
Probit regressions using clustered errors at the country level. Probit models accommodate the 
time-varying external pressure variables Contagion and IMF.  
Regressions (3) and (4) are Probit regressions of the adoption decision. These equations 
include year-fixed effects to control for unobserved common elements that make deposit 
insurance more desirable in countries as time goes by (other than those captured by the WB and 
EU Candidacy variables).  
Probit models assume that a country makes each year a decision about changing its 
deposit-insurance status.  However, once explicit insurance is in place, countries rarely jettison 
it. To parallel hazard models, we drop all post-adoption observations. Although the Probit 
approach uses right-censored observations that potentially bias the results, the Probit results turn 
out to be broadly similar to those obtained from the hazard models. 
Probit regressions (5) and (6) replace the time dummies by the time-varying external 
pressure variables Contagion and IMF. Contagion proxies how widely deposit insurance is 
believed to be a universal best practice. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that as more 
and more countries adopt deposit insurance, countries without deposit insurance become more 
likely to follow their lead. Although Contagion is strongly significant, IMF does not enter 
significantly once we control for the other sources of external influence.  
Overall, these experiments confirm the hypothesis that domestic private and public 
interests and external influence play important roles in adoption decisions. 
 
5. Explaining Deposit Insurance Design 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 The impact of the external pressure variables Contagion and IMF are already captured by the evolutionary trend α.    
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  We next use Heckman’s two-stage selection framework to investigate whether and how 
political and economic factors influence the design of deposit insurance systems in adopting 
countries. We test hypotheses about the “liberality” of system design. By the liberality of a 
design feature, we mean the extent to which empirical evidence summarized in Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Kane (2002) indicates that it is likely to promote moral hazard and risk-shifting by banks. To 
recognize that particular combinations of features might mute or reinforce the impact of some of 
the others, we construct a covariance matrix of design features in which each variable is 
standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. We define the first principal 
component of the covariance matrix of the eight features listed in section 2 as our first Moral 
Hazard index.  
  The first-stage equation is a selection model for adoption. It uses the same set of 
regressors used in the hazard models of Section 4. The second-stage models incorporate a 
regressor called Heckman’s Lambda that accounts for the sample-selection bias that would 
emerge if one sought to explain design features in a single-equation context.  As an inverse 
measure of the odds of adopting, this variable measures the degree to which adoption proves 
surprising. A positive and significant coefficient for Heckman’s Lambda indicates that latent 
characteristics that make adoption surprising also encourage liberality in design.  
  We experiment with two versions of Heckman’s two-step selection models.
10 First, we 
estimate a model using identical regressors in both stages. This model is identified only by the 
fact that Heckman’s Lambda is a nonlinear function of the regressors. Second, we estimate a 
model that excludes the selection variable Contagion from the second-stage regression. As 
shown in the previous section, Contagion is an important determinant of adoption. This variable 
                                                           
10 We obtain qualitatively similar results when using maximum likelihood to estimate the Heckman selection model.    
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satisfies the exclusion restriction if Contagion partly explains adoption (as shown in section 4), 
but does not wield much influence on decisions about the design features of deposit insurance. 
  Regression (1) of Table 7 uses the first principal component of the vector of design 
features as the endogenous variable in the second stage. Heckman’s Lambda receives a positive 
coefficient, indicating that latent characteristics that make adoption less likely also encourage 
liberality in design, but this variable is not statistically significant. We find that design features 
are more liberal in countries where insurance markets are relatively large. This is inconsistent 
with the view that the private interests of a powerful insurance lobby seeking to promote loss-
control features so as to make it harder for banks to compete with the insurance industry. If 
banks enjoy efficiency gains from economies of scope that rise with the size of the insurance 
markets, this sign would indicate pursuit of public benefits.  
We also find more risk controls in countries showing larger shares of elderly people. This 
is inconsistent with this demographic bloc’s private interests unless elderly people lobby for 
extensive risk controls to contain bank risk-shifting for fear that safety-net subsidies would end 
up being captured by people younger than themselves. 
The results also indicate that countries with higher levels of per capita income are more 
apt to adopt design features that mitigate moral hazard behavior by banks. This may be because 
sophisticated risk-control features such as coinsurance and risk-adjusted premiums are more 
readily understood and easier to enforce in economically developed countries. 
 We also find that countries are apt to adopt better risk controls if they also have more 
stringent capital regulations. This supports the view that capital requirements are complementary 
ways to limit risk-shifting. 
Finally, we find that countries that impose strict entry restrictions on banks tend to adopt 
a more-liberal deposit insurance scheme. This suggests that the banking industry has    
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extraordinary political clout in such countries, since entry restrictions and generous deposit 
insurance both enhance the franchise value of incumbent banks. 
Regression (2) includes year-fixed effects to control for unobserved elements that might 
make deposit insurance become more desirable in countries as time goes by. This experiment 
confirms that countries with large shares of undercapitalized banks adopt more liberal deposit 
insurance. This is consistent with the private interests of risky banks, who can benefit from 
extensive deposit insurance coverage and few risk controls. 
These experiments also show that more-democratic countries adopt more-liberal deposit 
insurance. This result is consistent with the private-interest view that the lobbying for deposit 
insurance subsidies is more effective where minority interest groups have better access to power. 
We also find that countries with high inflation rates and wide supervisory authority tend to have 
less generous deposit insurance schemes. The experiment confirms the positive (and now 
statistically significant) sign accorded Heckman’s Lambda. Latent characteristics that make 
adoption less likely also encourage liberality in design. This result underscores the value of 
making inferences about design in a two-stage framework.   
Regression (3) drops the time-fixed effects included in the previous regression and 
instead includes Contagion as selection variable in the first-stage regression. As before, the first-
stage regression indicates that as time goes by and more countries adopt deposit insurance, other 
countries become more likely to adopt deposit insurance. A positive and significant coefficient 
continues to be assigned to Heckman’s lambda. 
These findings are broadly consistent with those obtained using time-fixed effects, except 
that this experiment indicates that countries that run fiscal deficits seem less likely to impose risk 
controls and more likely to load contingent liabilities on the government.    
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Regression (4) explores the effects of introducing the external pressure variables IMF, 
WB, and EU Candidacy into the model, when excluding Contagion from the second stage. While 
we found earlier that external pressure by the WB and EU can lead countries to adopt deposit 
insurance earlier, this experiment indicates that these same pressures dispose countries to adopt 
schemes that include better risk controls. Expert advice that accompanies international pressure 
is likely to lead to more prudent design of deposit insurance. This experiment also indicates that, 
consistent with private-interest origins, countries with a larger proportion of small banks tend to 
prefer more liberal deposit insurance. 
Regression experiments (5) through (7) use alternative moral-hazard indices as the 
endogenous variable in second-stage regressions. The covariates included in these robustness 
checks and the first-stage regressions are the same as those in regression (4). The endogenous 
variable in regression (5) is a moral-hazard index based on the first two principal components of 
design features. Regression (6) uses the moral-hazard index based on the first three principal 
components of the design features. The endogenous variable in regression (7) is the simple 
average of the individual design-feature scores. While the results are broadly similar across the 
alternative specifications, a few differences emerge. In particular, the role of inflation and fiscal 
deficits lacks robustness again. 
Although not reported here, we also experimented with specifications including the 
alternative political-environment variables (Democracy, Executive Constraints, and Political 
Competition). These experiments show much the same results as those obtained when political 
institutions are proxied by Polity. 
Table 8 presents Heckman selection regressions for each of the design features that make 
up the composite moral hazard indices. First-stage coefficients are virtually identical in all 
columns. While second-stage estimates are similar across specifications, a few noticeable    
  29 
 
differences emerge. For example, while countries with a large proportion of small banks 
generally adopt fewer risk controls, they tend not to cover foreign-currency deposits. This may 
be because foreign-currency deposits flow largely to a country’s largest banks, so that small 
banks have little incentive to lobby for this form of coverage. 
Also, whereas previous experiments indicated that moral-hazard indices were not 
significantly influenced by the occurrence of banking crises, in this experiment coverage tends to 
increase in countries that experience banking crises. This finding is consistent with evidence 
presented by Hovakimian, Kane, and Laeven (2003) that systems adopted in crisis circumstances 
tend to be poorly designed.   
 
6. Summary 
Analyzing data covering the experience of up to 180 countries over the past four decades, this 
paper studies determinants of the adoption and design of explicit deposit insurance systems. 
Regression experiments confirm that the interplay of private and public interests influences the 
adoption and design of deposit insurance schemes. Within countries, outside influences and 
internal political factors significantly modify the intersectoral contracting process.    
Three principal findings emerge. First, countries with more-democratic environments and 
countries with a larger proportion of risky banks are more likely both to adopt deposit insurance 
and to design it with fewer risk controls. Other things equal, systems that allow sectoral interests 
to negotiate more openly with one another appear more likely both to adopt deposit insurance 
and to design it poorly. Second, deposit insurance is more likely to be adopted during financial 
crises, presumably because representatives for sectoral interests find it easier to negotiate 
regulatory reform in distressed circumstances. Third, external pressures from institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Union influence the    
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domestic decision-making process. Pressure to emulate developed-country regulatory 
frameworks appears to promote adoption of deposit insurance, but also to dispose a country 
toward better design. These inferences prove robust to a host of different statistical methods and 
control variables.    
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Table 1.  Explicit deposit insurance systems at year-end 2003 
 
This table lists the countries that adopted explicit deposit insurance systems by year-end 2003. All data refer to year-end 2003. We refer to the data section of this paper for details about 
the data sources and variable definitions. GDP per capita are from International Financial Statistics (IFS). The following “non-adopting” countries are included in our sample: 
Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia
e, Botswana, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon
g, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic
g, Chad
g, China, Comoro Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea
g, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon
g, Gambia, Georgia, 
Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hong Kong (China), Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kiribati, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova
d, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, 
Republic of Congo
g, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, St. Lucia, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay






















































Albania 2002  0  6,568 1,811 3.6 1 0 0
 h 01 1 10 0
Algeria 1997  0  8,263 2,135 3.9 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Argentina 1979  0  10,327 3,410 3.0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Austria 1979  0  25,260 31,429 0.8 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Bahamas 1999  0  50,000 17,497 2.9 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Bahrain 1993  0  39,894 13,741 2.9 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
Bangladesh 1984  0  1,021 380 2.7 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Belarus 1996  0  1,000 1,805 0.6 1 0 0
 i 11 0 10 0
Belgium 1974  0  25,260 29,320 0.9 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1998  0  3,228 1,812 1.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Brazil 1995  0  6,925 2,788 2.5 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Bulgaria 1995  0  9,686 2,549 3.8 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Canada 1967  0  46,425 27,080 1.7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Chile 1986  0  3,764 4,620 0.8 1 0 0
 i 00 1 11 0
Colombia 1985  0  7,192 1,796 4.0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Croatia 1997  0  16,343 6,484 2.5 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Cyprus 2000  0  25,260 16,134 1.6 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Czech Rep.  1994  0  31,575 8,881 3.6 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Denmark
c  1988 0  40,296 39,182 1.0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Dominican Republic  1962  1  Full 1,889 n.a. 1 0 1 n.a. 1 1 0 0 1
























































El Salvador  1999  0  4,720 2,265 2.1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
Estonia 1998  0  8,058 6,790 1.2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Finland 1969  0  31,863 31,034 1.0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
France 1980  0  88,410 29,805 3.0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Germany 1966  0  25,260 29,602 0.9 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Gibraltar 1998  0  25,260 n.a. n.a. 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Greece 1993  0  25,260 15,700 1.6 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Guatemala 1999  0  2,487 2,074 1.2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Honduras 1999  0  9,297 996 9.3 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Hungary 1993  0  14,429 8,209 1.8 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Iceland 1985  0  29,455 35,905 0.8 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
India 1961  0  2,193 564 3.9 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Indonesia 1998  1  Full 1,106 n.a. 1 n.a. 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland 1989  0  25,260 38,074 0.7 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Isle of Man  1991  0  35,694 29,424 1.2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Italy 1987  0  130,457 25,471 5.1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jamaica 1998  0  4,957 3,131 1.6 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Japan 1971  0  93,371 33,637 2.8 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Jordan 2000  0  14,104 1,979 7.1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Kazakstan 1999  0  2,774 2,068 1.3 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
Kenya 1985  0  1,313 459 2.9 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Korea 1996  0  41,925 12,710 3.3 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Kuwait 1982  0  Full 19,279 n.a. 1 n.a. 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Latvia 1998  0  5,545 4,810 1.2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Lebanon 1967  0  3,317 5,703 0.6 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Liechtenstein 1992  0  25,260 n.a. n.a. 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Lithuania 1996  0  16,293 5,369 3.0 1 0 0
 k 01 1 10 0
Luxembourg 1989  0  25,260 60,092 0.4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Macedonia 1996  0  25,260 2,285 11.1 1 0 0
 l 01 0 00 1
























































Malta 2003  0  25,260 12,169 2.1 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Marshall Islands  1975  0  100,000 2,171 46.1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Mexico 1986  0  2,871,337 6,327 453.9
a 10 1 01 1 10 0
Micronesia 1963  0  100,000 2,132 46.9 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Netherlands 1979  0  25,260 31,601 0.8 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Nicaragua 2001  0  20,000 779 25.7 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Nigeria 1988  0  366 463 0.8 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Norway 1961
b  0 299,401 48,193 6.2 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Oman 1995  0  52,016 8,600 6.0 1 0 0
 m 01 1 10 0
Paraguay 2003  0  10,500 1,026 10.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Peru 1992  0  19,773 2,238 8.8 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Philippines 1963  0  1,800 1,004 1.8 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Poland 1995  0  28,418 5,669 5.0 1 0 0
 n 01 1 00 0
Portugal 1992  0  31,575 14,108 2.2 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
Romania 1996  0  3,842 2,737 1.4 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Russia 2003  0  6,098 2,984 2.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Serbia and Montenegro  2001  0  87 2,535 0.0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Slovak Republic  1996  0  25,260 6,072 4.2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Slovenia 2001  0  26,931 14,065 1.9 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Spain 1977  0  25,260 20,974 1.2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Sri Lanka  1987  0  1,034 948 1.1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
Sweden 1996  0  34,364 33,670 1.0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
Switzerland 1984  0  24,254 43,848 0.6 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
Taiwan 1985  0  29,420 13,288 2.2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Tanzania 1994  0  235 279 0.8 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Thailand 1997  1  Full 2,263 n.a. 1 1 1 1 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Trinidad & Tobago  1986  0  7,937 8,297 1.0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Turkey 1983  1  Full 3,399 n.a. 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
Uganda 1994  0  1,550 233 6.7 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
























































United Kingdom  1982  0  19,611 30,173 0.6 1 0 0
 o 00 1 10 0
United States  1934  0  100,000 37,658 2.7 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
Venezuela 1985  0  6,258 3,250 1.9 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Vietnam 2000  0  1,948 488 4.0 n.a. n.a. 1 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Zimbabwe 2003  0  3,640 615 5.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
b In Norway, a private guarantee fund for savings banks with voluntary membership had been in place since 1921, with membership becoming obligatory in 1924. A private guarantee 
fund for commercial banks was first introduced in 1938. Both guarantee funds were not pure deposit insurance schemes but had wide mandates to support member banks in liquidity or 
solvency crisis. 
c Banks in Greenland with Danish ownership are covered by the Danish deposit insurance scheme. 
d Moldova has adopted deposit insurance in 2004. 
e While Bolivia does not have a formal deposit insurance system, it has a Financial Restructuring Fund set up in December 2001 that acts as deposit insurance. 
f Uruguay has established a deposit insurance system in 2002 (Law on protection of bank deposits was enacted on December 27, 2002, creating a bank deposits collateral fund  and a 
Superintendency of Bank Savings Protection), but it is not yet regulated. 
g A proposal for explicit deposit insurance was drafted in 1999 by these 6 Francophone African countries but the proposal has only been ratified by 2 out of the 6 Communauté 
Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Republic of Congo.  
h Coinsurance of up to 15% (up to 350,000 Lek full insurance, and from 35,000 to 700,000 insurance at 85%). 
i The equivalent of USD 2000 (per person per bank) is fully covered by  insurance. 80% coverage is provided for the next USD 3000 (that is from USD 2000 to USD 5000). Amounts 
exceeding the equivalent of USD 5000 per person per bank are not insured. 
j Full guarantee on time deposits; 90% coverage of savings deposits up to a limit of 120 Unidades de Fomento. (1 Unidad de Fomento = US$ 24). 
k Coverage of 100% up to LTL 10,000 and the balance at 90 percent. 
l Coverage of 100% up to 10,000 Euro; 90% next 10,000 Euro. 
m Coverage is RO 20,000 or 75% of net deposits, whichever is less. 
n Coverage is 100% of deposits up to 1000 Euro; and 90% from 1000 to 18000 Euro. 
o Coverage is 100% of the first ₤2000, and 90% of the next ₤33,000. 
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Table 2.  Summary statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the endogenous and explanatory variables used in the regressions.  See Appendix 1 for a detailed explanation of variables 
and data sources.  
Variable Mean  Median  Std. dev.  Min  Max  No. obs 
Endogenous        
Deposit  Insurance  0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00  7964 
Coverage ratio  6.24  2.46 13.72  0.05  117.86  920 
Foreign currency deposits  0.75 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00  1256 
Interbank deposits  0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00  1256 
Coinsurance  0.74 1.00 0.44 0.00 1.00  1221 
Payment  0.24 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00  1221 
Premiums  0.76 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00  1250 
Administration 0.55  1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00  1250 
Membership  0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00  1250 
Moral-hazard composite  0.00 -0.10  1.00 -1.25  4.63  912 
Explanatory        
Small  Banks  49.88 38.57 43.70  0.00  100.00  7084 
Undercapitalized Banks  65.22 66.49 22.46  7.67 98.08  6380 
Insurance  penetration  3.80 2.45 3.34 0.47  15.95  4400 
Pop65  5.78 4.04 3.85 1.00  19.33  7571 
Crisis  0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00  7964 
Polity score  -0.20  -3.00  7.64  -10.00  10.00  5667 
Democracy  score  3.76 1.00 4.20 0.00  10.00  5667 
Executive Constraints  3.88 3.00 2.34 1.00 7.00  5667 
Political  Competition  4.87 3.00 3.77 1.00  10.00  5667 
Log of GDP per capita  0.57  0.44  1.55  -3.01  4.03  5847 
Bureaucracy  2.13 2.00 1.08 0.00 4.00  6116 
Law & Order  3.69  3.58 1.29 0.95 6.00  6116 
GDP  Growth  3.64 3.89 5.82  -34.86  34.31  5811 
Inflation 13.82  6.51  22.33  -31.91  100.00  5788 
Fiscal  Surplus  -3.18  -2.75 3.21  -18.42 8.81  6336 
Capital stringency  4.08 4.00 1.52 1.00 7.00  5500 
Restrict  7.28 7.00 2.02 3.00  12.00  5940 
Entry  7.46 8.00 1.15 0.00 8.00  5896 
Official  10.75  11.00 2.79 4.00  14.00  5940 
Contagion  0.16 0.10 0.14 0.01 0.48  7964 
IMF  0.11 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00  7964 
WB  Loan  0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00  7964 
EU  Candidacy  0.01 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00  7964 
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Table 3.  Correlation matrix 
This table shows the bivariate correlation between the variables used in the regressions and the significance level of each correlation coefficient.  * indicates 


































































































































































































































































































Moral hazard composite   .76*                            






    
     
 
  
Undercapitalized banks  .21*  -.13*  -.14*  -.33*             
    
   
Insurance penetration  .15*  -.28*  -.12*  -.27*  .10*            
    
   
Pop65  .29*  -.30*  -.43*  -.41*  .25*  .43*           
    
   
Crisis Dummy  .10*  -.01  .02*  .01  .00  -.05*  -.04*         
    
   
Polity score  .42*  -.22*  -.21*  -.30*  .22*  .49*  .51*  .04*         
    
   
Exec. constraints  .40* -.23*  -.25*  -.34*  .24* .49* .52*  .03 .95*           
    
   
GDP per capita  .36* -.25*  -.33*  -.64*  .26* .56* .69*  -.09* .52* .54*         
    
   
GDP Growth  -.02 .02  .04 -.10* .04*  .00 -.05* -.12* -.06* -.06* .02       
    
   
Inflation  -.07* -.05 -.03  .06* -.03* -.18*  -.05* .18* -.02 -.04* -.12* -.26*     
    
   
Fiscal surplus  .10* -.05  -.06  -.09*  .00 .03 .10* .01 -.03  -.04* .21*  .03*  -.09*   
    
   
Capital stringency  .06* -.02  -.24*  -.06* .09* .11* .01 -.04* .04* .05* .05* .04*  -.04* .12* 
    
   
Restrict  -.12*  .31*  .35*  .28* -.08* -.15*  -.27* .00  -.02  -.03  -.32* .04*  .06*  -.25*  .05         
Entry  -.06*  .06  .18* .23* -.01 -.14*  -.08* .04* -.20* -.21* -.21* -.04*  -.04* .07*  .05*  .09*           
Official  -.04*  .12*  .20*  -.01 -.04 -.10* -.16* .04* -.22* -.20* -.09* .07* -.03 -.04* .04* .06* .19*         
Contagion  .37*  -.11*  -.12*  .00 .00  .00 .01 .15*  .24* .21* .04* -.11*  .05* .00 .00 .00 .00 .00      
IMF  .28*  -.10*  -.08*  .00 .00  .00 .01 -.01  .15* .13* .02 -.02  -.07* .00 .00 .00 .00 .00  .74*    
World Bank Loan  .15*  -.04  -.07*  .00  -.01  -.07* .05* .02  .09* .07* .01 .00 .00 .02  -.08* .00 .01 .01  .19*  .18*   
EU Candidacy  .16* -.08*  -.17*  -.03*  -.05* -.06* .18* .05*  .15* .16* .07* .00  .02 .06*  -.05*  -.03  .02 .04* .19* .14* .26*    
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Table 5.  Hazard models of deposit-insurance adoption 
 
This table presents hazard regressions seeking to explain the hazard rate of adopting explicit deposit insurance over the period 1960-2002. The model considers the 
adoption of deposit insurance as a “transforming event.”  The endogenous variable is the number of years between 1960 and the adoption date. The assumed 
distribution of the hazard function is Weibull. The coefficients reported are the logarithms of the underlying relative-hazard coefficients. Regressions 2 to 4 consider 
alternative proxies for political institutions. Regression 5 controls for the scope and quality of bank regulations and supervision. Regression 6 includes additional 
proxies for the institutional environment of the country. Regressions 7 to 10 add external influence variables, using alternative proxies for political institutions. The 
number of adopting countries is the number of countries that have adopted deposit insurance during the observation period. An intercept is used but not shown. Lin 
and Wei (1989) standard errors are shown in brackets. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Small  Banks  -0.013**  -0.013**  -0.012** -0.013*** -0.015**  -0.017***  -0.016** -0.017** -0.016** -0.016** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Undercapitalized  Banks  0.013** 0.013*  0.012* 0.013**  0.016** 0.015* 0.015**  0.015**  0.015**  0.016** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Pop65  0.053 0.053 0.057 0.046 0.040 0.031 -0.007  -0.005 0.003 -0.005 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.046) (0.051) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.056) 
Crisis  1.220*** 1.227*** 1.192*** 1.237*** 1.104*** 1.084***  0.751  0.773  0.758  0.781* 
  (0.304) (0.307) (0.309) (0.296) (0.410) (0.415) (0.495) (0.501) (0.505) (0.474) 
Polity  0.058**      0.098**  0.101***  0.091**      
  (0.027)      (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)      
Democ   0.102**          0.164**    
    (0.049)        (0.066)    
Executive  constraints     0.181**          0.292**  
     (0.085)          (0.114)  
Political  competition      0.133**        0.170** 
      (0.055)        (0.073) 
Log of GDP per capita  -0.026  -0.044  -0.015  -0.044 -0.269 -0.277 -0.168 -0.237 -0.188 -0.204 
  (0.178) (0.182) (0.176) (0.176) (0.271) (0.280) (0.290) (0.292) (0.284) (0.299) 
Real  GDP  growth  -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.003 -0.001 -0.032 -0.028 -0.025 -0.032 
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) 
Inflation  -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007  -0.017*  -0.018*  -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Fiscal  surplus  0.070*  0.072*  0.069*  0.075*  0.094 0.081 0.046 0.057 0.054 0.055 
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.069) (0.068) (0.067) (0.065) (0.063) (0.066)    
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Insurance  penetration       -0.102  -0.070 -0.045 -0.044 -0.048 -0.030 
       (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.063) 
Capital  Stringency          0.015 0.032 0.013 0.010 0.016 0.021 
       (0.094)  (0.093)  (0.093)  (0.094)  (0.091)  (0.095) 
Restrict       -0.178*  -0.177*  -0.141 -0.140 -0.127 -0.125 
       (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.093) 
Entry       -0.067  -0.062  -0.032 -0.036 -0.046 -0.036 
       (0.093)  (0.087)  (0.090)  (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.090) 
Official          0.011 0.002 0.025 0.022 0.013 0.010 
       (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.064) 
Bureaucracy        -0.355  -0.257  -0.261  -0.304  -0.233 
        (0.284)  (0.316)  (0.317)  (0.320)  (0.314) 
Law  and  Order        0.177  0.147  0.154  0.181  0.143 
        (0.230)  (0.232)  (0.233)  (0.240)  (0.228) 
WB         0.775  0.755  0.883  0.572 
         (0.586)  (0.606)  (0.572)  (0.552) 
EU  Candidacy         1.092***  1.015**  0.922**  1.244*** 
         (0.411)  (0.426)  (0.422)  (0.423) 
            
Observations  3175 3175 3175 3175 1808 1786 1786 1786 1786 1786 
Number  of  countries  119  119  119  119  72 71 71 71 71 71 
Number  of  adopting  countries  63 63 63 63 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Model χ
2  92.73 92.21 87.31 96.87 60.94 67.53  101.18  99.66 99.28  106.95 
Evolutionary parameter α  2.16 2.17 2.15 2.14 2.29 2.31 2.06 2.10 2.08 2.05 
 
    
   
Table 6.  Alternative models of deposit-insurance adoption 
 
This table presents regressions that explain the adoption of explicit deposit insurance over the period 1960-2002. Regressions 1 and 2 are based on a proportional Cox 
(1972) hazard model. The endogenous variable is the number of years between 1960 and the adoption date. Regressions 3 and 4 are based on a Probit model with 
year-fixed effects. Regressions 5 and 6 are based on a Probit model without year-fixed effects. The endogenous variable is the explicit deposit-insurance indicator. 
We drop observations after deposit insurance is adopted in the country. An intercept is used but not shown. For regressions 1 and 2, Lin and Wei (1989) standard 
errors are shown in brackets.  For regressions 3 to 6, White standard errors are shown in brackets. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Small Banks  -0.014***  -0.018**  -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.009*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Undercapitalized Banks  0.014**  0.017**  0.008**  0.010***  0.008***  0.009** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Pop65  0.066 -0.009 0.033 -0.008 0.009 -0.009 
  (0.042) (0.054) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.025) 
Crisis  1.097*** 0.771 0.520*** 0.411 0.476***  0.427* 
  (0.318) (0.491) (0.173) (0.253) (0.179) (0.245) 
Polity  0.048* 0.088** 0.020*  0.041*** 0.017  0.035** 
  (0.028) (0.039) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) 
Log  of  GDP  per  capita  0.023 -0.199 0.013 -0.110 0.033 -0.076 
  (0.177) (0.306) (0.082) (0.135) (0.079) (0.131) 
Real  GDP  growth  -0.031 -0.031 -0.010 -0.009 -0.014 -0.009 
  (0.025) (0.034) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) 
Inflation -0.003  -0.013  -0.000 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Fiscal  surplus  0.069 0.049  0.035*  0.024 0.024 0.019 
  (0.045) (0.073) (0.021) (0.031) (0.019) (0.029) 
Insurance  penetration   -0.039  -0.017  -0.023 
   (0.069)  (0.036)  (0.034) 
Bureaucracy   -0.273  -0.181  -0.130 
   (0.332)  (0.160)  (0.162) 
Law  and  Order   0.206  0.117  0.093 
   (0.250)  (0.119)  (0.114) 
Capital  Stringency   -0.001  0.009  0.013 
   (0.093)  (0.045)  (0.043)    
   
Restrict   -0.150  -0.081  -0.065 
   (0.103)  (0.050)  (0.046) 
Entry   -0.019  -0.013  -0.019 
   (0.091)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
Official   0.020  -0.006  -0.007 
   (0.071)  (0.030)  (0.028) 
WB   0.563    0.631*  0.808**  0.594 
   (0.580)  (0.371)  (0.331)  (0.374) 
EU  Candidacy   1.135**   0.820***  0.737***  0.663*** 
   (0.495)  (0.279)  (0.201)  (0.212) 
IMF       -0.318  -0.523 
       (0.249)  (0.327) 
Contagion       2.900***  3.356*** 
       (0.675)  (0.819) 
        
Observations  3175 1786 2087 1062 3176 1062 
Countries  119 71 119 71 119 71 
Number of adopting 
countries 
63 50 63 50 63 50 
Chi-squared  87.24  61.07  126.29 168.60 154.56 168.60 
Pseudo-R2  --  --  0.17 0.16 0.20 0.16    
   
Table 7.  Heckman two-step selection model for deposit-insurance coverage and other design features 
 
This table reports a series of Heckman two-stage selection regressions for design features. The endogenous variable in the first-stage regression (selection equation) is the explicit 
deposit insurance indicator. The endogenous variable in the second-stage (design equation) is a composite moral hazard index. In regressions (1) to (4), we use the moral hazard index 
based on the first principal component of following design features: Coverage ratio, Foreign currency deposits, Interbank deposits, Coinsurance, Payment, Premiums, Administration, 
and Membership. In regression (5), we use the moral hazard index based on the first two principal components of the design features. In regression (6), we use the moral hazard index 
based on the first three principal components of the design features. In regression (7), we use the moral hazard that is the simple average of the design feature variables. All design 
features have been transformed to standardized variables (with mean zero and standard deviation of one) for the principal component calculations. We report Heckman’s (1979) two-
step efficient estimates. Model (2) includes year-fixed effects in both the first-stage and second-stage regression. Model (3) adds the Contagion variable as selection variable to the first-
stage regression. Models (4) to (7) add the external influence variables to the first-stage and second-stage regressions. Standard errors are shown in brackets and *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Second-stage: Design             
Small  Banks  -0.000  -0.003  0.003*  0.005***  0.018*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Undercapitalized Banks  0.006  0.009***  0.004**  0.001  0.006**  0.015***  0.033*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Insurance penetration  0.088**  0.078***  0.095***  0.083***  0.124***  0.091***  0.107** 
  (0.037) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.032)  (0.043) 
Pop65  -0.058*** -0.048*** -0.055*** -0.027*** -0.123***  -0.112***  -0.138*** 
  (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.019)  (0.026) 
Crisis  0.197  0.138  0.055  0.091  0.180 0.095 0.168 
  (0.237) (0.110) (0.077) (0.071)  (0.119)  (0.174)  (0.235) 
Polity 0.047  0.055***  0.024***  0.023***  0.054***  0.069***  0.049** 
  (0.047) (0.019) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.021) 
Log of GDP per capita  -0.202***  -0.305***  -0.188*** -0.268***  -0.326***  -0.560***  -1.367*** 
  (0.034) (0.077) (0.031) (0.030)  (0.050)  (0.073)  (0.099) 
Bureaucracy -0.065  -0.007  -0.079  -0.161***  0.192**  -0.022  0.227 
  (0.061) (0.076) (0.054) (0.050)  (0.085)  (0.124)  (0.168) 
Law and Order  0.021  0.050  0.042  0.137***  0.052  0.556***  0.739*** 
  (0.059) (0.048) (0.038) (0.036)  (0.060)  (0.088)  (0.118) 
Real GDP growth  -0.010  -0.006  -0.002  0.009  0.010  0.009  0.048** 
  (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.023) 
Inflation -0.006  -0.007**  -0.003*  -0.002 -0.006**  -0.000  -0.020*** 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)    
   
Fiscal surplus  -0.029*  -0.020  -0.035***  -0.017  0.030*  0.044*  0.074** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.026)  (0.035) 
Capital Stringency  -0.160***  -0.166***  -0.163*** -0.213***  -0.459***  -0.523***  -0.470*** 
  (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.026)  (0.038)  (0.052) 
Restrict 0.020  0.005  0.052***  0.061***  0.053**  0.019  -0.125*** 
  (0.056) (0.030) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.032)  (0.043) 
Entry  0.186***  0.181***  0.176***  0.192***  0.341*** 0.432*** 0.492*** 
  (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.048) 
Official  0.041  0.041**  0.027***  0.029***  0.095*** 0.262*** 0.148*** 
  (0.030) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.024)  (0.032) 
IMF       0.056  0.123  0.300**  0.270 
        (0.056)  (0.095) (0.138) (0.187) 
WB       -0.601***  -0.845***  -1.227***  -1.225*** 
        (0.108)  (0.183) (0.266) (0.361) 
EU Candidacy        -0.738***  -1.830***  -2.242***  -3.091*** 
        (0.095)  (0.161) (0.235) (0.318) 
Heckman’s  lambda  0.571  0.848***  0.284***  0.166***  0.317*** 0.489*** 0.710*** 
  (0.644) (0.287) (0.058) (0.063)  (0.106)  (0.154)  (0.209) 
First-stage: DI             
Small Banks  -0.009***  -0.019***  -0.018***  -0.018*** -0.018***  -0.018***  -0.018*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Undercapitalized  Banks  0.012***  0.018***  0.018***  0.018***  0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Insurance penetration  -0.081***  -0.032*  -0.040**  -0.037**  -0.037** -0.037** -0.037** 
  (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Pop65  -0.000  0.015  0.005  0.004  0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Crisis  0.542***  0.306**  0.412***  0.346***  0.346*** 0.346*** 0.346*** 
  (0.114) (0.124) (0.121) (0.122)  (0.122)  (0.122)  (0.122) 
Polity  0.101***  0.100***  0.095***  0.095***  0.095*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Log of GDP per capita  0.006  -0.394***  -0.306*** -0.315***  -0.315***  -0.315***  -0.315*** 
  (0.042) (0.054) (0.051) (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.053) 
Bureaucracy  0.014  0.132  0.167**  0.173**  0.173** 0.173** 0.173** 
  (0.073) (0.086) (0.085) (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.087) 
Law  and  Order  -0.085*  0.043  0.014  0.014  0.014 0.014 0.014    
   
  (0.048) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.056) 
Real GDP growth  -0.034***  -0.011  -0.014  -0.015*  -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Inflation -0.015***  -0.012***  -0.009***  -0.010*** -0.010***  -0.010***  -0.010*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Fiscal  surplus  0.024*  0.056***  0.047***  0.046***  0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
  (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Capital Stringency  0.005  -0.011  -0.012  -0.011  -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Restrict -0.126***  -0.149***  -0.141***  -0.143*** -0.143***  -0.143***  -0.143*** 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Entry  0.008  0.032  0.028  0.030  0.030 0.030 0.030 
  (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Official  0.065***  0.066***  0.066***  0.065***  0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 
  (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
IMF       -0.453***  -0.453***  -0.453***  -0.453*** 
        (0.143)  (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
WB        0.104  0.104 0.104 0.104 
        (0.225)  (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) 
EU  Candidacy        0.135  0.135 0.135 0.135 
        (0.179)  (0.179) (0.179) (0.179) 
Contagion      5.999***  6.727***  6.727*** 6.727*** 6.727*** 
      (0.301)  (0.414)  (0.414) (0.414) (0.414) 
             
Observations  2450  2450  2450  2450  2450 2450 2450 
Censored  observations  1739  1739  1739  1739  1739 1739 1739 
    
   
Table 8.  Heckman two-step selection model for deposit-insurance design features: individual design features 
 
This table reports a series of Heckman two-stage selection regressions for design features. The endogenous variable in the first-stage regression (selection equation) is the explicit 
deposit insurance indicator. The endogenous variable in the second-stage (design equation) is one of the following design features that make up the moral hazard index: Coverage ratio, 
Foreign currency deposits, Interbank deposits, Coinsurance, Payment, Premiums, Administration, or Membership. All design features have been transformed to standardized variables 
(with mean zero and standard deviation of one). We report Heckman’s (1979) two-step efficient estimates. All models include the Contagion variable as selection variable in the first-
stage regression. Standard errors are shown in brackets and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Second-stage: Design  Coverage ratio  Foreign currency 
deposits 
Interbank deposits  Coinsurance  Payment  Premiums  Administration  Membership 
Small Banks  -0.018*  -0.007***  0.002***  0.002**  -0.001  0.004***  0.003***  0.001*** 
 (0.010)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Undercapitalized Banks  0.002  0.001  0.004***  -0.003***  0.005***  0.007***  0.002***  -0.000 
 (0.012)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Insurance penetration  -0.274***  -0.020***  -0.009  0.038*** -0.050*** -0.003  0.074***  0.008*** 
 (0.102)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.003) 
Pop65 0.076  0.031***  -0.011**  -0.021*** -0.020***  -0.019***  -0.023***  -0.001 
 (0.063)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
Crisis 1.787***  -0.018  0.082**  0.077*  0.069  0.002  -0.171***  0.002 
 (0.564)  (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.015) 
Polity 0.076  -0.014***  0.012***  0.003  0.009**  -0.000  0.011***  -0.001 
 (0.051)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
Log of GDP per capita  -0.233  -0.151***  -0.081*** -0.161***  0.025  0.012  -0.295***  0.021*** 
 (0.236)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.007) 
Bureaucracy 1.575***  -0.168***  0.163***  -0.190***  0.112***  0.239***  -0.092***  0.001 
 (0.401)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.011) 
Law and Order  -1.693***  0.232***  -0.063***  0.227***  0.146***  -0.201***  0.134***  -0.050*** 
 (0.283)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.008) 
Real GDP growth  0.036  0.003  -0.000  -0.002  0.000  0.001  0.013***  0.003* 
 (0.056)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
Inflation -0.033***  0.001*  -0.003***  0.002**  0.006***  -0.007***  0.000  -0.001*** 
 (0.013)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Fiscal surplus  0.109  0.000  0.058***  -0.022***  -0.020***  0.045***  0.004  -0.029*** 
 (0.084)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.002) 
Capital Stringency  -0.309**  0.104***  -0.094*** -0.098***  -0.041***  0.019*  -0.112*** 0.001    
   
 (0.124)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.003) 
Restrict 0.429***  -0.036***  -0.025***  0.023***  -0.003  -0.044***  0.003  0.012*** 
 (0.104)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.003) 
Entry 0.314***  -0.048***  0.081***  0.085***  0.060***  -0.038***  0.033***  0.019*** 
 (0.115)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.003) 
Official 0.168**  -0.012**  0.039***  -0.044***  0.069***  0.006  0.028***  -0.021*** 
 (0.077)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.002) 
IMF -0.622  0.040  0.048  0.036  0.103***  -0.042  0.031  -0.020 
 (0.450)  (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.012) 
WB 0.967  0.027  -0.264***  -0.443***  -0.044  0.205***  -0.117  -0.001 
 (0.866)  (0.068)  (0.072)  (0.076)  (0.072)  (0.070)  (0.072)  (0.024) 
EU Candidacy  -1.359*  0.188***  -0.302***  -0.384***  -0.367***  0.000  -0.628***  0.040* 
 (0.763)  (0.059)  (0.062)  (0.066)  (0.063)  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.021) 
Heckman’s lambda  1.978***  -0.048  0.249***  0.057  0.126***  -0.048  -0.108***  -0.009 
 (0.499)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.044)  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.014) 
First-stage: DI                
Small Banks  -0.018***  -0.017***  -0.017***  -0.017*** -0.017***  -0.017***  -0.017***  -0.017*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Undercapitalized Banks  0.018***  0.012***  0.012***  0.012***  0.012***  0.012***  0.012***  0.012*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Insurance penetration  -0.037**  -0.032**  -0.032**  -0.032** -0.032**  -0.032**  -0.032**  -0.032** 
 (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Pop65 0.004  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.006 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Crisis 0.346***  0.472***  0.472***  0.472***  0.472***  0.466***  0.466***  0.466*** 
 (0.122)  (0.111)  (0.111)  (0.111)  (0.111)  (0.112)  (0.112)  (0.112) 
Polity 0.095***  0.080***  0.080***  0.080***  0.080***  0.080***  0.080***  0.080*** 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Log of GDP per capita  -0.315***  -0.281***  -0.281*** -0.281***  -0.281***  -0.280***  -0.280***  -0.280*** 
 (0.053)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051) 
Bureaucracy 0.173**  0.157*  0.157*  0.157*  0.157*  0.156*  0.156*  0.156* 
 (0.087)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.084) 
Law and Order  0.014  0.075  0.075  0.075  0.075  0.074  0.074  0.074 
 (0.056)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
Real GDP growth  -0.015*  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006 -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006 
 (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)    
   
Inflation -0.010***  -0.004**  -0.004**  -0.004** -0.004**  -0.004**  -0.004**  -0.004** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Fiscal surplus  0.046***  0.043***  0.043***  0.043***  0.043***  0.043***  0.043***  0.043*** 
 (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Capital Stringency  -0.011  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007 
 (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Restrict -0.143***  -0.115***  -0.115***  -0.115*** -0.115***  -0.115***  -0.115***  -0.115*** 
 (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Entry 0.030  0.024  0.024  0.024  0.024  0.024  0.024  0.024 
 (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Official 0.065***  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.010 
 (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
IMF -0.453***  -0.340**  -0.340**  -0.340** -0.340**  -0.342**  -0.342**  -0.342** 
 (0.143)  (0.137)  (0.137)  (0.137)  (0.137)  (0.137)  (0.137)  (0.137) 
WB 0.104  0.024  0.024  0.024  0.024  0.027  0.027  0.027 
 (0.225)  (0.219)  (0.219)  (0.219)  (0.219)  (0.219)  (0.219)  (0.219) 
EU Candidacy  0.135  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006 -0.006  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005 
 (0.179)  (0.173)  (0.173)  (0.173)  (0.173)  (0.173)  (0.173)  (0.173) 
Contagion 6.727***  6.403***  6.403***  6.403***  6.403***  6.395***  6.395***  6.395*** 
 (0.414)  (0.394)  (0.394)  (0.394)  (0.394)  (0.394)  (0.394)  (0.394) 
                
Observations 2450  2519  2519  2519  2519  2513  2513  2513 
Censored observations  1739  1739  1739  1739  1739  1739  1739  1739 
  
 
Appendix 1. Variable definitions and data sources 
Whenever we indicate the data source as “Authors’ calculation”, we refer to the data section of this paper and to Appendix 2 for 
details about the data sources and variable definitions. 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Deposit Insurance  Dummy that equals 1 if the country has explicit deposit insurance (including 
blanket guarantees) and 0 if it has implicit deposit insurance. 
Authors’ calculation. 
Coverage ratio  Coverage limit of deposit insurance scheme in local currency divided by GDP 




Equals 1 if foreign deposits are covered by the deposit insurance scheme, 0 if 
they are not covered, and missing otherwise. 
Authors’ calculation 
Interbank deposits  Equals 1 if interbank deposits are covered by the deposit insurance scheme, 0 if 
they are covered, and missing otherwise. 
Authors’ calculation 
Coinsurance  Equals 1 if deposit insurance scheme has no coinsurance, 0 if it has coinsurance, 
and missing otherwise. 
Authors’ calculation 
Payment  Equals 1 if coverage is per account, 0 if coverage is per depositor, and missing 
otherwise. 
Authors’ calculation. 
Premium  Equals 1 if deposit insurance premiums are flat, 0 if premiums are risk-adjusted, 
and missing otherwise. 
Authors’ calculation. 
Administration  Equals 1 if the administration of the deposit insurance scheme is public, 0 if it is 
private or joint (public and private), and missing otherwise. 
Authors’ calculation 
Membership  Equals 1 if membership to the deposit insurance scheme is voluntary, 0 if it is 
compulsory to all banks, and missing otherwise. 
Authors’ calculation 
Moral hazard  Principal component of the variables coverage ratio, foreign deposits, interbank 
deposits, coinsurance, payment, premium, administration, and membership. All 
variables are standardized with mean of zero and standard deviation of one 
before conducting the principal component analysis. 
Authors’ calculation 
Small banks  Share of banks in the country with total assets less than 1 billion U.S. dollars.  Bankscope     
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Average over the period 1995-99. 
Undercapitalized 
banks 
Share of banks in the country with capital-to-asset ratio less than the median 




Gross insurance premiums underwritten as a share of GDP. Average over the 
period 1987-2002. 
WDI 
Pop65  Share of population age 65 and over.  WDI 
Contagion  Fraction of countries in the sample that has adopted explicit deposit insurance 
at each point in time. 
Authors’ calculation. 
IMF  Dummy variable that takes a value of one for the years 1999 and onwards, the 
year 1999 being the year that the IMF endorsed deposit insurance by publishing 
a paper on best practices and guidelines in deposit insurance, and zero 
otherwise. 
Garcia (2000) 
WB loan  Dummy variable that takes the value of one during and following the year that 
the World Bank started an adjustment lending program with the country for 
reforms to establish deposit insurance (in addition to possibly other objectives), 
and zero otherwise. This variable takes a value of one for the following 
countries and periods (between brackets): Albania (2002 and onwards), Bolivia 
(1998 and onwards), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996 and onwards), Croatia (1995 
and onwards), El Salvador (1996 and onwards), Jordan (1995 and onwards), 
Lithuania (1996 and onwards), Nicaragua (2000 and onwards), Poland (1993 
and onwards), Romania (1996 and onwards), Russia (1997 and onwards), 
Ukraine (1998 and onwards). 
World Bank (2004) 
EU Candidate  Dummy variable that takes a value of one for the years 1994 and onwards for 
EU candidate countries only (i.e., Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia), and zero otherwise. The year 1994 was the year when the EU 
Directive on Deposit Insurance came into force. 
EU (1994)     
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Crisis  Dummy variable that takes a value of one in years that the country is 
experiencing a systemic banking crisis, and zero otherwise. 
Caprio, Klingebiel, 
Laeven and Noguera 
(2005) 
Polity Score  Index combining democracy and autocracy scores.  It ranges from –10 to 10, 
where negative scores are assigned to countries under autocracies and positive 
values to countries under democracies and –10 and 10 are the extreme cases of 
these two systems.  Autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive 
political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized 
process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise 
power with few institutional constraints.  Democracy is conceived as three 
essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and 
procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about 
alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized 
constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of 
civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation. 
Polity IV, INSCR 
Program, CIDCM, 
University of Maryland, 
College Park 
Democracy  Democracy score. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores denoting more 
democratic systems. Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent 
elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which 
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. 
Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power 
by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their 
daily lives and in acts of political participation. 
Polity IV, INSCR 
Program, CIDCM, 




Index measuring the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-
making powers of chief executives.  Such limitations may be imposed by any 
accountability group.  The index ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 represents 
unlimited authority and 7 Executive parity or subordination. 
Polity IV, INSCR 
Program, CIDCM, 
University of Maryland, 
College Park     
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Political 
Competition 
Index combining regulation of participation and competitiveness of 
participation scores.  It ranges from 1 to 10, where higher scores represent 
more political competition.  Participation is regulated to the extent that there 
are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are 
expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both regulate 
participation but they do so in different ways, the former by channeling 
participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of 
opinion; the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete 
nonviolently for political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated 
participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations 
and no effective regime controls on political activity. In such situations 
political competition is fluid and often characterized by recurring coercion 
among shifting coalitions of partisan groups. The competitiveness of 
participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and 
leadership can be pursued in the political arena. 
Polity IV, INSCR 
Program, CIDCM, 
University of Maryland, 
College Park 
GDP per capita  GDP per capita (constant 1995 thousands of US$).  WDI 
Bureaucracy  Index measuring the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy.  It 
ranges from 0 to 4.  High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy 
has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the 
bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to 
have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that 
lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a 
change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and 
day-to-day administrative functions. Average over the period 1984-2002. 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
Law & Order  Index measuring a country’s legal system and rule of law. It ranges from 0 to 6, 
where a high score indicates high level of law and order. Law and order are 
assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to three points.  
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG)     
 
Variable Definition  Source 
The law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system while the order sub-component is an assessment of popular 
observance of law. Average over the period 1984-2002. 
GDP Growth  Real GDP growth rate (in %).  WDI 
Inflation  Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %).  WDI 
Fiscal surplus  Fiscal surplus to GDP (in %). Positive values denote fiscal surpluses. Negative 





An index of the stringency of capital regulations in the banking system. The 
index captures whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements 
and deducts certain market value losses from capital before minimum capital 
adequacy is determined. Index ranges from 0 to 7. Higher values denote greater 
stringency. Data refer to the year 2003. 
Barth et al. (2006) 
Activity restrictions  An index that measures the degree to which banks can engage in securities 
underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting and selling, and real estate 
investment and management. Index ranges from 3 to 12. Higher scores denote 
more restrictiveness. Data refer to the year 2003. 
Barth et al. (2006) 
Entry restrictions  An index that captures regulatory requirements to obtain a license to set up a 
bank. Index ranges from 0 to 8. Higher scores indicate greater stringency. Data 
refer to the year 2003. 
Barth et al. (2006) 
Official supervisory 
power 
An index of the extent to which supervisory authorities have the authority to 
discipline banks by taking specific actions to prevent and correct problems. 
Index ranges from 0 to 14. Higher scores denote greater power. Data refer to 
the year 2003. 
Barth et al. (2006) 
    
 